Still Waters Run Deep(fakes): The Rising Concerns of “Deepfake” Technology and Its Influence on Democracy and the First Amendment by Wilkerson, Lindsey
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 1 Article 12 
Winter 2021 
Still Waters Run Deep(fakes): The Rising Concerns of “Deepfake” 
Technology and Its Influence on Democracy and the First 
Amendment 
Lindsey Wilkerson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lindsey Wilkerson, Still Waters Run Deep(fakes): The Rising Concerns of “Deepfake” Technology and Its 
Influence on Democracy and the First Amendment, 86 MO. L. REV. () 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





Still Waters Run Deep(fakes): The Rising 
Concerns of “Deepfake” Technology and Its 




“A video circulated that suggested that I was a pedophile.  What do you 
say to that?  You go on Twitter and argue you’re not a pedophile?  I mean, 
there’s no excuse for that, no defense.”1  During the Obama Administration, 
Michael McFaul served as the U.S. ambassador to Moscow.  During his term, 
he claimed he was the subject of Russian propaganda “[that] accused [him] of 
plotting to overthrow leader Vladimir Putin as well as pedophilia.”2  In 
February 2018, McFaul said an altered video was posted on YouTube falsely 
showing him walking the streets of Moscow with a convicted pedophile.3  
McFaul’s claims, if true, would be the first case of a government official 
having their reputation attacked by “digitally constructed videos that can 
 
*Bachelors of Journalism, University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019-2020.  
I am grateful to Professor Wells for her insight, guidance, and support during the 
writing of this summary, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing 
process. 
 1. This quote is from former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul when 
he appeared on the CBC Radio show, “The Current.” The fight against ‘deepfake’ 
videos includes former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, CBC RADIO (July 
20, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-july-20-2018-
1.4754632/the-fight-against-deepfake-videos-includes-former-u-s-ambassador-to-
russia-michael-mcfaul-1.4754674 [https://perma.cc/87N7-8974] [hereinafter “The 
Current”]. 
 2. Laura King & Sabra Ayres, What you need to know about Michael McFaul, 
the ex-U.S. envoy drawn into the center of another Trump-Russia flap, L.A. TIMES 
(July 19, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-mcfaul-
20180719-story.html [https://perma.cc/QAL6-BFAN].  
 3. Michael McFaul, The Smear that Killed the ‘Reset’: Putin Needed an 
American Enemy. He Picked Me.,  WASH. POST (May 11, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/11/feature/putin-
needed-an-american-enemy-he-picked-me/ [https://perma.cc/4VAD-FQV5].  
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make it appear that a person is saying or doing something they never did,” 
also known as “deepfakes.”4  
This Note explores how deepfake technology can disrupt democracy and 
influence elections through the protections given to political speech under the 
First Amendment.  Part II describes deepfakes in greater detail and identifies 
the wide uses for deepfake technology.  Part III reflects on how the federal 
government and states are attempting to regulate deepfakes, mainly to protect 
individuals from pornographic exploitation and election tampering.  Finally, 
Part IV discusses in detail how the First Amendment creates constitutional 
barriers in regulating deepfakes. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Deepfakes are a new and evolving form of technology that allow people 
to make manipulated videos that can have potentially devastating impacts if 
used in the wrong hands.  While the technology behind deepfakes is complex, 
the ability to make deepfakes is only becoming more accessible as time 
passes.  There are plenty of uses for deepfakes; they could jeopardize 
individual privacy, fair elections, and perhaps democracy overall.  But there 
are some benefits from the use of deepfake technology, including the 
promotion of self-expression – a hallmark of the First Amendment.  Because 
of this, deepfakes can be viewed through the lens of the First Amendment, 
particularly parodies and the protection of lies. 
A. What are “Deepfakes”? 
Deepfakes – sometimes stylized as “deep fakes” or “deep-fakes” – are 
videos that are digitally manipulated to make it look like a person “is 
realistically saying or doing something they didn’t.”5  The new technology 
has been spreading virally on the internet for various reasons, including 
pornography and parody.6  Some political and legal experts are concerned, 
however, about deepfake technology being used in the near future to tamper 
with elections across the globe.7 
 
 4. The Current, supra note 1. 
 5. Benhamin Goggin, From porn to Game of Thrones: How deepfakes and 
realistic-looking fake videos hit it big, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 23, 2019, 9:45 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/deepfakes-explained-the-rise-of-fake-realistic-
videos-online-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/BE7E-T464].  
 6. Id.; see also Cntl Shift Face, Better Call Trump: Money Laundering 101 
[DeepFake], YOUTUBE (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ho9h0ouemWQ [https://perma.cc/HS9T-
RAGP] (showing a deepfake of President Donald Trump as one of the characters in a 
well-known scene in the TV show “Breaking Bad”). 
 7. Grace Shao, Fake videos could be the next big problem in the 2020 elections, 
CNBC (Jan. 17, 2020, 2:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/deepfakes-
could-be-problem-for-the-2020-election.html [https://perma.cc/KM5V-39DY] 
(quoting John Villasenor, a professor at UCLA focusing on artificial intelligence and 
2
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Deepfake technology has its roots in pornography; it gained popularity 
in 2017 when lewd videos surfaced showing celebrity faces on pornographic 
actors and actresses.8  The number of deepfakes online doubled between 2018 
and 2019.9  With the increasing prominence of deepfakes, “some of the most 
influential people in the world, and their audiences, have become targets of 
deepfakers.”10  The first viral deepfake was a pornographic video that featured 
Wonder Woman lead actress Gal Gadot’s face digitally transplanted on top of 
the face of an actual pornographic actress.11  The video was first posted on the 
social media website Reddit by a user named “deepfakes,” thus coining the 
title “deepfake” for these types of videos.12  Deepfakes can be freakishly 
realistic since they are “trained on hours of footage, [and have] been 
specifically generated for its context, with seamless mouth and head 
movements and appropriate coloration.”13  As technology has progressed, 
deepfakes have become easier to create since anyone with “a computer, 
internet access, and interest in influencing an election” can make one.14  Some 
apps have even been developed that allow smartphone users to create 
deepfakes at the touch of their fingertips.15 
 




ampaign=tedspread [https://perma.cc/VYQ4-3BLV] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020). 
 8. Goggin, supra note 5. 
 9. HENRY AJDER ET. AL, DEEPTRACE, THE STATE OF DEEPFAKES: LANDSCAPE, 
THREATS, AND IMPACT, 1 (SEPT. 2019). Deeptrace, the organization behind this report, 
started as a way to understand, research, and identify deepfakes. Id. 
 10. Goggin, supra note 5. 
 11. Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All F*****d, VICE 
(Dec. 11, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadot-
fake-ai-porn [https://perma.cc/GR9C-9QNW] (The title of this article has been edited 
to remove profane language). 
 12. Goggin, supra note 5. 
 13. Id.; see also Supasorn Suwajanakorn, Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip 
Sync from Audio, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Yq67CjDqvw [https://perma.cc/GR9C-9QNW] 
(showing a step-by-step process used by University of Washington research students 
to make a deepfake of President Barack Obama). 
 14. Shao, supra note 7. 
 15. See, e.g., Ivan Mehta, New Deepfake App Pastes Your Face onto GIFs in 
Seconds, NEXT WEB (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://thenextweb.com/artificial-
intelligence/2020/01/13/new-deepfake-app-pastes-your-face-onto-gifs-in-seconds/ 
[https://perma.cc/E4CV-DEB5]; Zak Doffman, Chinese Deepfake App ZAO Goes 
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B. What are the Main Uses and Threats of Deepfakes? 
While deepfakes originated in the pornography industry, there are 
growing concerns about how they could interfere with politics and elections 
and threaten individual privacy.  Maybe it is not surprising that with the 
growth and general accessibility of any video-editing software, the “Average 
Joe” is able to manipulate videos in order to create a false perception of 
another person.16  Perhaps what is more disturbing, however, is the reaction 
and confusion that these altered videos can create.17  This Part discusses the 
threats to democracy, elections, and individual privacy that deepfakes may 
cause, while also noting how they can be protected from regulation by 
arguments for creative freedom and self-expression.  
1. Threats to Democracy and Elections 
Deepfakes could potentially change the political sphere, spin elections, 
and increase the dissemination of “fake news.”  Deepfakes have been 
described by some as “a powerful new tool for those who might want to (use) 
misinformation to influence an election.”18  One possible example of this was 
provided by privacy law scholar Danielle Citron at a TED Talk about 
deepfakes.19  She described a hypothetical where, the night before an election, 
a deepfake spreads online showing one of the major party candidates had 
fallen ill.20  Citron claimed that the deepfake “could tip the election and shake 
our sense that elections are legitimate.”21  When placed in the wrong hands, 
“deepfakes have the potential to corrode the trust that we have in democratic 
institutions.”22 
Citron is not the only scholar worried about this problem; in fact, news 
outlets like CNBC and The Guardian have reported the same concerns.23  
They compare the spread of deepfakes to the threat of fake news in the 2016 
 
 16. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, 
Spread Across Social Media, WASH. POST (May 23, 2019 3:41 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-
slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-social-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/UX2L-RJKL] (discussing how an altered video of House Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi, which made it appear like she was “drunkenly slurring her words,” 
created confusion and prompted ridicule online). 
 17. Id. (same). 
 18. Shao, supra note 7 (quoting John Villasenor, a professor at UCLA focusing 
on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity). 
 19. Citron, supra note 7.   
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.   
 22. Id. 
 23. Shao, supra note 7; Oscar Schwartz, You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep 




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/12
2021] DEEPFAKES, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 411 
election.24  In response to this, social media websites are making policy 
changes to prevent the spread of deepfakes, especially after the criticisms 
about the increase of fake news.25  For example, leading up to the 2020 
election and census, YouTube announced that it would not “allow election-
related ‘deepfake’ videos and anything that aims to mislead viewers about 
voting procedures and how to participate in the 2020 census.”26 
Other social media websites have also established limitations to 
publishing deepfakes, but their limitations seem to be focused more on 
limiting the spread of misinformation and “fake news,” rather than election 
tampering.  Facebook first put out a statement that it had “strengthen[ed]” its 
policies “toward misleading manipulated videos that have been identified as 
deepfakes” in response to growing concerns about the dominance of its 
presence online.27  Some news outlets interpreted this statement as Facebook’s 
commitment to completely ban deepfakes from its website.28  Similarly, 
Reddit has terminated some forums that were previously started by users to 
share deepfakes in an effort to stop the spread of deepfakes on its website.29  
On a broader scale, Twitter and Pornhub have completely banned the 
publication of deepfakes on their websites.30 
While these policies are sometimes labeled as a ban, it is possible that 
some “loopholes” may exist around them.31  For example, Facebook’s 
 
 24. Shao, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 23. 
 25. See Dave Lee, Matter of Fact-Checkers: Is Facebook Winning the Fake News 
War?, BBC (April 2, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47779782 
[https://perma.cc/HRU2-MSJ6] (showing that people “felt Facebook was not listening 
to their feedback on how to improve the tool it provides to sift through content flagged 
as ‘fake news.’”). 
 26. Matt O’Brien, YouTube: No ‘Deepfakes’ or ‘Birther’ Videos in 2020 
Election, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/3397d5dec4972ce12cac5037eeb9f226 [https://perma.cc/8YRJ-
L8VQ] .   
 27. Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, FACEBOOK (Jan. 6, 
2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/8DPL-U5EH].  
 28. David McCabe & Davey Alba, Facebook Says It Will Ban ‘Deepfakes’, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/facebook-
says-it-will-ban-deepfakes.html [https://perma.cc/X7CA-UVSG].   
 29. r/deepfakes, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/deepfakes 
[https://perma.cc/7PFC-3NU8] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (showing that this 
subreddit was banned); r/celebfakes, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/Celebfakes/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XUP-K2FV] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (same). 
 30. Samantha Cole, Twitter Is the Latest Platform to Ban AI Generated Porn, 
VICE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ywqgab/twitter-
bans-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/CJ7U-FPUW].  
 31. See Betsy Morris, Facebook Bans Deepfakes but Permits Some Altered 
Content, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2020, 5:33 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-deepfake-video-ban-permits-some-altered-
content-11578384519 [https://perma.cc/2WSM-NEBU]; Aaron Holmes, Facebook 
Just Banned Deepfakes, but the Policy Has Loopholes — and a Widely Circulated 
5
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deepfake policy has exceptions for “deepfakes meant as satire as well as 
misleading videos made with less sophisticated tools.”32  Under the First 
Amendment, this tracks with case law about parody speech.33  However, in 
the fight against “fake news,” this policy may be troubling to individuals 
concerned about the spread of false information.34 
At the heart of the election tampering and “fake news” concerns rest the 
overall worries about generalized harm to society, including distortion of 
democratic discourse, eroding trust in institutions and journalism, increasing 
social divisions, and threats to national security.35  Before the 2020 
presidential election, there were concerns that deepfakes would be “prevalent 
and problematic.”36  While deepfakes were certainly circulated during the 
2020 election season,37 later reports dated closer to the election suggested that 
the concern over deepfake election tampering was overhyped.38  Outside of 
elections, politicians on both sides of the aisle have worried about how 
deepfakes could threaten national security, suggesting deepfakes are a 
“conceivable political weapon.”39  Diplomats and ambassadors have claimed 
that they have been the target of deepfakes.40  Some scholars have warned 
about the “Liar’s Dividend,” a term coined for the potential phenomenon that 
public figures may start claiming their missteps were actually fake news, 
publicized through a deepfake, rather than a truthful statement.41 
 
Deepfake of Mark Zuckerberg Is Allowed to Stay Up, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2020, 
10:07 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-just-banned-deepfakes-but-
the-policy-has-loopholes-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/4TK4-REM8]. 
 32. Holmes, supra note 31. 
 33. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of 
the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow 
of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”). 
 34. Holmes, supra note 31 (“‘Facebook wants you to think the problem is video-
editing technology, but the real problem is Facebook’s refusal to stop the spread of 
disinformation.’”). 
 35. Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for 
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1771–86 
(2019). 
 36. Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27 
CATH. U.J.L. & TECH. 51, 59 (2018). 
 37. David Frum, The Very Real Threat of Trump’s Deepfake, THE ATLANTIC 
(April 27, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/trumps-first-
deepfake/610750/ [https://perma.cc/J9CP-S2XH] (showing that President Donald 
Trump reposted deepfake of his opponent, Joe Biden, on Twitter). 
 38. Tim Mak & Dina Temple-Raston, Where Are The Deepfakes In This 
Presidential Election?, NPR NEWS (Oct. 1, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/01/918223033/where-are-the-deepfakes-in-this-
presidential-election [https://perma.cc/53RT-TANS].  
 39. Hall, supra note 36, at 59. 
 40. Id. at 60; see McFaul, supra note 3. 
 41. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1785. 
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2. Threats to Individual Privacy 
Some legal experts are also concerned with the use of deepfakes to harm 
individuals, either through exploitation or sabotage.42  Examples of 
exploitation purposes could include, but are not limited to, financial 
blackmail, revenge porn, and possibly even “fraudulent kidnapping claims.”43  
Deepfake revenge porn seems to be considered the most prominent concern 
in this category.44  Revenge porn – the dissemination of pornographic videos 
or photos without the subject’s consent or knowledge – could be transformed 
into a new beast by using deepfake technology.45  Now, a person could be the 
subject of a porn video without having even performed the sex act being 
showcased in the video.46 
3. The Defense of Deepfakes: Self-Expression 
But while critics have been quick to bring up various problems with 
deepfakes, it is important to acknowledge that there could be some benefits to 
the new technology – mainly its ability to promote self-expression.47  For 
example, there is some evidence that deepfake technology could be used to 
alter audio files and “restore the ability of persons suffering from certain forms 
of paralysis, such as ALS, to speak with their own voice.”48  Additionally, 
comedic parody deepfakes could be considered self-expression.49  One 
YouTube channel dedicated to this purpose, Cntl Shift Face, has already 
garnered more than 300,000 subscribers since it started publishing deepfakes 
 
 42. Id. at 1772–75; see Citron, supra note 7. 
 43. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1772–73. 
 44. Rebecca A. Delfino, Pornographic Deepfakes: The Case for Federal 
Criminalization of Revenge Porn’s Next Tragic Act, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 925 
(2019) (“Immediately after celebrity-based pornographic deepfakes emerged in late 
2017 and went viral on the internet, legal scholars and journalists raised the alarm that 
this conduct implicated the First Amendment protections afforded to online content.”); 
see Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1773. 
 45. Delfino, supra note 44, at 891. 
 46. Id. (“Because deepfake technology can be used to create realistic 
pornographic videos without the consent of the individuals depicted, and since these 
videos can be broadly distributed on the internet, pornographic deepfakes exist in the 
realm of other sexually exploitative cybercrimes such as revenge porn and 
nonconsensual pornography.”). 
 47. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1770; see also Jessica Silbey & 
Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 MD. L. REV. 960, 966 (2019). 
 48. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1771 
 49. Cntl Shift Face, supra note 6. (showing a deepfake of President Donald 
Trump as one of the characters in a well-known scene in the TV show “Breaking 
Bad”). 
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in 2019.50  Deepfake parody videos usually consist of an actor or celebrity 
deepfaked into different context than normally expected, aimed at a comedic 
or entertaining purpose.51  For example, in Cntl Shift Face’s most popular 
video on YouTube, titled “Bill Hader impersonates Arnold Schwarzenegger 
[DeepFake],” actor Bill Hader is pictured on a late-night talk show speaking 
to the show’s host, Conan O’Brien.52  When Hader begins to impersonate 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s recognizable accent as part of a joke, Cntl Shift 
Face slowly morphs Hader’s face into Schwarzenegger’s.53  Videos like the 
one described tend to go viral online, spread through various different social 
media platforms, like YouTube and Instagram, for example.54 
C. Applicable First Amendment Law 
This Note specifically focuses on how deepfakes could be viewed under 
the First Amendment.  Depending on the content and the situation of which it 
arises, deepfakes could be viewed under several different branches of the First 
Amendment.  First, the deepfaker could claim that the video was a political 
parody.  Second, the deepfaker could argue that the First Amendment 
generally protects lies.  Lastly, if the deepfake includes pornographic images, 
it might be covered under obscenity, child porn, or revenge porn law. 
1. Politics, Parodies, and Privacy 
Not all uses of deepfakes are villainous; in fact, many people claim to 
use the technology to comment on politics and poke fun at governmental 
 
 50. Cntl Shift Face, YOUTUBE (last visited April 11, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKpH0CKltc73e4wh0_pgL3g 
[https://perma.cc/Z3PK-ERCF].  
 51. See, e.g., Cntl Shift Face, supra note 6; Cntl Shift Face, Jim Carrey DeepFake 
[VFX Comparison], YOUTUBE (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbzVhzNaTdI [https://perma.cc/4DLV-WAK5] 
(showing a deepfake of Jim Carrey taking the place of Jack Nicholson’s role in The 
Shining); Collider Videos, Deepfake Roundtable: Cruise, Downey Jr., Lucas & More 
- The Streaming Wars | Above the Line, YOUTUBE (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_6Tumd8EQI [https://perma.cc/2XA6-3Z92] 
(showing a roundtable of “celebrities” that are actually impersonators with deepfaked 
faces of celebrities). 
 52. Cntl Shift Face, Bill Hader impersonates Arnold Schwarzenegger 
[DeepFake], YOUTUBE (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPhUhypV27w [https://perma.cc/66NH-
RUBU]. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Collider Videos, supra note 51; @bill_posters_uk, INSTAGRAM (June 7, 
2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/ByaVigGFP2U/ (showing a deepfake of Mark 
Zuckerberg with more than 120,000 views). 
8
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officials.55  Because of this, it is likely that these deepfakes could be protected 
under the First Amendment if they are classified as parodies.56  It is important 
to note that the First Amendment itself, which establishes that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” applies only to 
governmental regulation of speech.57  It does not apply to private parties.58  
So, privately owned social media websites like Facebook and Twitter have 
the ability to remove or block deepfakes from being posted on their platforms 
without violating the First Amendment rights of social media users.59 
Parodies are “an attack on folly” and generally imitate an existing work 
for some comedic purpose.60  Parodies are definitely not new; “[f]rom the 
early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present 
day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in 
public and political debate.”61  Parodies are tied closely with political 
speech,62 and under the First Amendment, political speech is given a 
significant amount of deference by courts.63 
There is no question that government officials, who are often the subjects 
of these political parodies, are considered “public figures” under the law.64  
This means they can often be subjected to “vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
 
 55. See e.g., Cntl Shift Face, supra note 6 (showing a deepfake of President 
Donald Trump as one of the characters in a well-known scene in the TV show 
“Breaking Bad”). 
 56. See Holmes, supra note 31. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 58. Lata  Nott, Is your speech protected by the First Amendment?, FREEDOM 
FORUM INSTITUTE, https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-
center/primers/basics/ [https://perma.cc/ZV43-BDJJ] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) 
(outlining what the First Amendment protects). 
 59. See Sara Fischer & Ashley Gold, All the platforms that have banned or 
restricted Trump so far, AXIOS, https://www.axios.com/platforms-social-media-ban-
restrict-trump-d9e44f3c-8366-4ba9-a8a1-7f3114f920f1.html 
[https://perma.cc/86XT-4925] (Jan. 11, 2021) (showing that many social media 
companies banned former President Donald Trump from their platforms because he 
violated the websites’ policies and guidelines). See also Rich Barlow, Break Up 
Twitter? Or Ban Trump? Where Does Social Media Go from Here?, BU TODAY, 
http://www.bu.edu/articles/2021/trump-banned-on-social-media-not-first-
amendment-issue/ [https://perma.cc/6ZL5-TC5K] (Jan. 11, 2021) (showing that social 
media companies, like Twitter, can ban users from using its website when they do not 
comply with the website’s conditions). 




 61. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Stromberg v. People of State of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The 
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion . . . is a fundamental 
principle of our constitutional system.”). 
 64. See, e.g. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).  
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unpleasantly sharp attacks.”65  The landmark parody case involving a public 
figure is Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, in which a well-known minister sued 
the magazine for emotional distress after a parody piece depicted him as an 
incestuous drunk.66  The United States Supreme Court noted that the nature 
of parodies is that they are “not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-
sided.”67   
Generally, to bring a tort claim, a public figure would need to prove the 
“speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts.”68  
For libel and emotional distress cases, the public figure would also need to 
show that “the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made 
with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with 
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.”69  New York Times v. 
Sullivan initially created the “actual malice” test for public officials’ libel 
claims,70 and Falwell extended it to emotional distress cases.71  The actual 
malice standard has been described in more detail as “a constitutional rule that 
allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can 
prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with 
the requisite level of culpability.”72  So, in applying this analysis to deepfakes, 
if President Donald Trump wanted to sue the creator of a deepfake parody 
made about him, for example, he would have to demonstrate that the deepfake 
could be reasonably believed as truthful, in addition to proving that the 
deepfaker had “actual malice” in creating and publishing the deepfake online. 
Similarly to the libel and emotional distress cases involving parodies, a 
victim of deepfakes would also have a difficult time bringing a false light 
privacy claim due to the “actual malice” standard for public figures.73  A claim 
for false light privacy can be brought when a person has given “publicity to a 
matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false 
light.”74  The standard used for determining false light privacy claims is based 
upon whether the perception given to the person is “offensive to a reasonable 
 
 65. Id. at 270. It is important to note that ordinary individuals – those that are not 
public figures – do not have to meet the actual malice requirement. Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
 66. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). 
 67. Id. at 54. 
 68. Id. at 50. 
 69. Id. at 56. 
 70. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 71. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56. 
 72. Id. at  52 (emphasis added). 
 73. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (holding that a magazine 
publisher could not be held liable “in the absence of proof that the defendant published 
the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.”); Douglas 
Harris, Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You, 17 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 99, 115 (2019); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977) (showing that a victim must prove that the offender knew or 
recklessly regarded the fact that the information is false). 
 74. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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person.”75  It would not be an easy task to prove a false light privacy case 
against a deepfaker, especially since the victim would need to prove that other 
people actually recognized that the deepfake truly put them in a “false light.”76  
This means that the public would have to understand that the deepfake was 
false and that it negatively portrayed the victim through its falsity. 
2. The First Amendment’s Protection of Lies 
On the surface, the entire point of deepfakes is to spread lies – the videos 
show people in circumstances or positions that are simply untrue, regardless 
of the deepfaker’s intent.  The Supreme Court has been consistent in saying 
that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”77  However, 
generally, the First Amendment still protects some lies.78  This stance 
“comports with the common understanding that some false statements are 
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public 
and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to 
guarantee.”79  Lies about the government and its officials, since they relate to 
political speech, may be protected under this rationale as well.80   
Regardless, there remains the availability of criminal and civil liability 
– like libel and slander – to punish the speaker for their lies depending on the 
speaker’s culpability, position as a public figure, and the subject matter of the 
speech.81  However, if the questionable deepfake does not fall under one of 
these existing exceptions, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
truthfulness of speech will generally be revealed through the marketplace of 
ideas.82  The reliance on the traditional “marketplace of ideas” concept in 
regards to deepfakes is shaky, however, if the deepfake is particularly 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. Harris, supra note 73, at 117. 
 77. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
 78. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (“Absent from those few 
categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general 
exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
 81. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 
(1985) (showing that “actual malice” is not required if the speech is not related to a 
subject of “public concern”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) 
(showing that the “actual malice” standard does not apply to standard individuals); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (showing that the First Amendment 
does not protect speech that incites “imminent lawless action”); Chaplinsky v. State 
of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (showing that the First Amendment 
does not protect “fighting words”). 
 82. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727–728 (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech 
that is true. . . . The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”). 
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convincing, misleading, and deceptive.83  A deepfake could be so realistic that 
the truth may never prevail unless there is some intervention, either through 
private website owners or by the government.84 
3. Obscenity, Child Porn, or Revenge Porn?  
Similarly, victims of sexually explicit deepfakes would also have a 
difficult time proving the deepfake was a form of revenge porn.  The First 
Amendment recognizes exceptions for obscenity and child pornography – 
generally, pornography cannot be banned unless it is obscene.85  Therefore, 
the status quo of the law makes it difficult to sue for revenge porn unless there 
is an applicable state statute specifically prohibiting it or the case includes 
unlawful child pornography.86  The Supreme Court outlined a three-pronged 
test for obscenity cases not involving children in Miller v. California to 
determine if the pornographic content had value outside of its obscenity: (1) 
if “‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,” (2) 
“whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,” and (3) “whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.”87  Proving the first and third prongs in court would likely be left to 
case-by-case analyses based upon the “reasonable person” standard.  
However, if states continue to regulate deepfakes under their statutes – as 
described in more detail in Part III, Subpart B – it may be easier to meet the 
second Miller test requirements, as it could make it easier to find the 
“applicable state law.” 
Additionally, some courts have already started discussions on how 
deepfakes will impact future child pornography cases.88  While wide bans of 
 
 83. See Hall, supra note 36, at 52–53 (“In the past we have relied on the 
‘marketplace of ideas’ concept, which encourages more speech as a means to uncover 
the truth and have the best ideas rise to the fore, rather than censor particular content. 
Is this argument still valid when the public cannot discern what information is true, 
misleading, or false?”). 
 84. At the time of this Note, there are no laws in place that would prohibit social 
media websites like Facebook or Twitter from removing deepfakes on their platforms, 
unlike how the First Amendment could prohibit the government from doing the same. 
 85. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002). 
 86. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (showing there is no First 
Amendment protection for child pornography and outlining a specific test for any 
exceptions); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2019) (showing California’s 
revenge porn statute). 
 87. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 88. See In re S.K., 215 A.3d 300, 315 n.22 (2019); United States v. Streett, No. 
CR 14-3609 JB, 2020 WL 231688, at *47 n.28 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 2020). The focus on 
child pornography is likely because children are particularly vulnerable. See Ferber, 
458 U.S. at 764 (showing that “kiddie porn” is not protected under the First 
Amendment). 
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child pornography have not been upheld under the First Amendment,89 states 
are generally given discretion and leniency in how much they choose to 
regulate child pornography.90  In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court 
announced a stricter standard than Miller in deciding child pornography cases.  
To be unlawful, the child pornography does not require a “prurient interest of 
the average person.”91  The sexual conduct shown also does not need to be 
portrayed in “a patently offensive manner,” and the material does not need to 
be considered in its entirety.92 
Lastly, if the deepfake is just a form of porn – meaning it does not include 
sexually explicit imagery of children and is found to not be obscene – there is 
no remaining way to regulate it under the First Amendment.93  If a state has 
passed a revenge porn statute, however, then it is possible that the deepfake 
and its creator could be penalized under that law.  Most states have created 
revenge porn statutes relying on privacy concerns and worries about 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.94  Many of these statutes now 
include language about deepfakes.95 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
It is not a simple task to protect individual rights and bolster democracy 
against threats from malicious deepfakes, some action has taken place by the 
federal and state government.  Subpart A discusses how some federal 
legislation has been tossed around the House and Senate proposing to regulate 
deepfakes, but most attempts have been futile.  However, Subpart B 
demonstrates that some states have successfully crafted and passed legislation 
to control deepfakes pertaining to election tampering and obscenity. 
A. The Push and Stall in Federal Intervention 
At the time of this Note, there have been numerous Congressional 
attempts to regulate deepfakes; only one of them has succeeded in being 
signed into law.96  This Part explores four leading pieces of legislation that 
 
 89. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258. 
 90. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. 
 91. Id. at 764. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Delfino, supra note 44, at 925 (pointing to obscenity as one of the only 
First Amendment claims to make regarding pornographic deepfakes). 
 94. 46 States + DC + One Territory NOW have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER 
CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE (last visited April 12, 2020), 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/Z2DP-BS9H].  
 95. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a)(2) (West 2019); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-386.2(A) (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2019). 
 96. NDAA for FY 2020, S.1790, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 5709, 133 Stat. 1198, 
2168 (2019). 
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members of Congress have put forward regarding deepfakes, which are all 
aimed at preventing federal political interference. 
1. Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018 
The first federal bill targeting deepfakes, the “Malicious Deep Fake 
Prohibition Act of 2018,” was introduced by Senator Ben Sasse (R-Neb.) in 
December 2018.97  The bill was read twice and sent to committee, but that is 
the farthest it went.98  This is probably due to the ambitious nature of the bill, 
which, if passed, would have created a “new criminal offense related to the 
creation or distribution of fake electronic media records that appear 
realistic.”99  The bill was relatively short, just including sections for 
definitions, offenses, and exceptions.100  The intent or the actual distribution 
of a deepfake would have been against federal law if the deepfaker had “actual 
knowledge that the audiovisual record is a deep fake” and still distributed it 
anyway.101  The Act would have subjected convicted deepfakers to no more 
than two years in prison, unless the deepfake was found to “facilitate 
violence” or  “affect the conduct” of government or election proceedings.102  
Interestingly, the bill had a limitation that “[n]o person shall be held liable 
under this section for any activity protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”103   
2. DEEP FAKES Accountability Act 
About six months after the Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018 
was introduced, the “DEEP FAKES Accountability Act” surfaced in the 
House, led by Representative Yvette D. Clarke (D-NY).104  Representative 
Clarke had twenty-eight co-sponsors on the bill; all of them were members of 
the Democratic Party.105  The Act was noticeably longer than the Malicious 
 
 97. Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, S. 3805, 115th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(2018). 
 98. Actions Overview S.3805 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/3805/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/WGY4-Y94Q].  
 99. Summary: S.3805 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/3805.  
 100. S. 3805. 
 101. S. 3805 § 1041(b)(1)–(2). 
 102. S. 3805, § 1041(c)(1)–(2). 
 103. S. 3805, § 1041(d)(2). 
 104. Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping 
Exploitation Subject to Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. 
(2019) [hereinafter “DEEP FAKES Accountability Act”]. 
 105. Cosponsors: H.R.3230 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
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Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, and it covered more aspects.  For 
example, the Act discussed digital watermarking deepfake videos so they 
would be more identifiable, plus requiring “clearly articulated” video and 
audio disclosures to show that the deepfakes were altered videos.106 
The Act also allowed for both criminal and civil penalties for failure to 
disclose that the videos were altered.107  The Act covered deepfakes with the 
“intent of influencing a domestic public policy debate” and “interfering in a 
Federal, State, local, or territorial election. . .”108  Compared to the Malicious 
Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act 
carried a larger criminal sentence of up to five years.109  For private actions, 
damage amounts were outlined, ranging from $50,000 to $150,000 for each 
violative deepfake.110  Injunctive relief was also described as a private action 
remedy.111 
Another interesting part of this Act is the creation of several task forces 
and coordinators to help enforce the Act.  First, the Act dedicated a section to 
victim assistance, specifically tasking the Attorney General to place “a 
coordinator in each United States Attorney’s Office to receive reports from 
the public regarding potential violations . . . relating to deep fake depictions 
produced or distributed by any foreign nation-state . . . and coordinate 
prosecutions for any violation of such section.”112  This section was likely 
aimed at preventing the spread of deepfake revenge porn.113  Similarly, the 
Act would have created a “Deep Fakes Task Force” within the Department of 
Homeland Security to help “combat the national security implications of deep 
fakes.”114 
The DEEP FAKES Accountability Act was referred to several 
committees in June 2019, but it was effectively tabled by the Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security just a few weeks after its initial 
introduction on the House floor.115  The Act covered a lot of information and 




 106. H.R. 3230, § 1041(a)–(e). 
 107. Id. at § 1041(f). 
 108. Id. at § 1041(f)(1)(B)(iv). 
 109. Id. at § 1041(f). 
 110. Id. at § 1041(g)(2). 
 111. Id. at § 1041(g)(3). 
 112. Id. at § 1042(a). 
 113. See Devin Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act would impose 
unenforceable rules — but it’s a start, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2019), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/deepfakes-accountability-act-would-impose-
unenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start/ [https://perma.cc/9586-9NNU].  
 114. H.R. 3230, § 918 sec. 7 (a). 
 115. All Actions H.R.3230 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/3230/all-actions [https://perma.cc/9586-9NNU ].  
 116. See Coldewey, supra note 113. 
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was criticized by deepfake regulation activists and critics alike; some said the 
Act was overly broad and threatened individuals’ First Amendment 
protections, and others said there were too many exceptions to where it could 
not be effective in preventing the spread of deepfakes.117 
3. Deepfake Report Act of 2019 
Just a month after the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act, the “Deepfake 
Report Act of 2019” was introduced by Senator Rob Portman (R-Ohio).118  
The House sent the Act to a subcommittee in October 2019 but never 
reconsidered it.119  The Act would have required “the Department of 
Homeland Security to report at specified intervals on the state of digital 
content forgery technology.”120  This Act reached farther than just deepfakes; 
according to the Act’s summary, “digital content forgery” includes all 
“artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques, to fabricate or 
manipulate audio, visual, or text content with the intent to mislead.”121  The 
Deepfake Report Act is similar in some way to its predecessor, the Malicious 
Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018.  It is much shorter and narrower in scope 
than the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act.122  The Deepfake Report Act only 
required the Department of Homeland Security to “produce a report on the 
state of digital content forgery technology” and conduct relevant public 
hearings to gather more information about the topic.123  Media coverage at the 
time of this Act’s introduction was limited, so it is uncertain why this Act 
specifically failed. 
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
The omnibus National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(“NDAA for FY 2020”) is the only successfully passed legislation so far 
regarding deepfakes.124  The Act is lengthy and complex, but one section is 
dedicated to a “report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of 
 
 117. See Mathew Ingram, Legislation aimed at stopping deepfakes is a bad idea, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July 1, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/legislation-
deepfakes.php [https://perma.cc/N2PX-46TS]. 
 118. S.2065 – Deepfake Report Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV (last visited Mar. 13, 
2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2065 
[https://perma.cc/QRS4-YJML]. 
 119. Actions Overview S.2065 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/2065/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/42GK-5YVG].  
 120. Summary: S.2065 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/2065 [https://perma.cc/S7L5-ACPU]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Deepfake Report Act of 2019, S.2065, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. (2019). 
 123. S.2065, sec. 3. (a), (c)(2). 
 124. S.1790 § 5709. 
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deepfakes, and related notifications.”125  Within 180 days of the Act’s 
passage, the Director of National Intelligence must consult with appropriate 
intelligence leaders and develop a report to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees consisting of “the potential national security impact 
of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as ‘deepfakes’)” and the 
uses of deepfakes by “foreign governments to spread disinformation.”126  
Specifically, the report is required to include information about the “technical 
abilities” of China and Russia in creating and disseminating deepfakes, 
particularly for uses relating to “discrediting political opponents or disfavored 
populations . . .”127  The section also requests research about how the United 
States could quickly identify and defend against a deepfake attack.128  The bill 
was signed into law on December 20, 2019.129  The report from the Director 
of National Intelligence, then, is due by June 17, 2020 (180 days after the 
Act’s passage). As of November 18, 2020, the report had not been completed 
and was still under development. 
B. States Are Taking the Matters Into Their Own Hands 
States have started the discussion about deepfakes in two ways: 
preventing the dissemination of certain sexually explicit deepfakes and 
preventing deepfake election tampering.  First, some states have tackled 
deepfakes when it relates to sexually explicit content.130  For example, 
Maryland amended its statute prohibiting child pornography to include 
deepfake technology.131  It now prohibits deepfakes that are 
“[i]ndistinguishable from an actual and identifiable child” and contain “a 
computer-generated image that has been created, adapted, or modified to 
appear as an actual and identifiable child.”132  However, the statute expressly 
mentions that it does not cover typical parody art forms, such as “drawings, 
cartoons[,] sculptures[,] or paintings.”133   
Virginia and California amended their revenge porn statutes to penalize 
the dissemination of deepfakes if they are used for revenge porn purposes.134  
California’s revenge porn statute describes photos and videos that include 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at § 5709(a)(1). 
 127. Id. at § 5709(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 128. Id. at § 5709(a)(2)(C). 
 129. All Actions S.1790 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/1790/actions [https://perma.cc/KZ5P-YGGP]. 
 130. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
386.2(A) (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2020). 
 131. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (West 2019). 
 132. Id. at § 11-208(a)(2). 
 133. Id. at § 11-208(a)(3). 
 134. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2(A) (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 
(West 2020). 
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“[c]omputer-generated nude body parts as the nude body parts of the depicted 
individual,” and “[t]he depicted individual engaging in sexual conduct in 
which the depicted individual did not engage.”135  There are exceptions to 
liability under California’s law, for example, if the altered videos are “[a] 
matter of legitimate public concern,” “[a] work of political or newsworthy 
value or similar work,” or “[c]ommentary, criticism, or disclosure that is 
otherwise protected by the California Constitution or the United States 
Constitution.”136  
Some states have started to regulate deepfakes if they are used to 
interfere with elections.  California and Texas have both enacted these type of 
laws.137  In September 2019, Texas was the first state to take steps to regulate 
deepfakes in the election context.138  The amendment of the state’s election 
code punishes a person who intends to “injure a candidate or influence the 
result of an election” by creating a deepfake video and publishes or distributes 
it within 30 days of an election.139  There are no exceptions to the law, which 
has garnered some criticism from legal experts about its constitutionality 
under the First Amendment.140 
Just a month later, California passed legislation that amended the state’s 
election code to prohibit deepfakes published “within 60 days of an election” 
if they were distributed “with actual malice . . . [and] with the intent to injure 
the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for or against the 
candidate, unless the media includes a disclosure stating that the media has 
been manipulated.”141  The law does not use the term “deepfake” to describe 
the “deceptive audio or visual media,” although news outlets have recognized 
that was the legislature’s intent in passing the law.142  The law also allows 
candidates that are the victims of deceptive deepfakes to sue for injunctive 
relief or monetary damages.143  Unlike Texas, the California law includes 
exceptions for parody deepfakes and paid-for broadcast advertisements.144 
 
 135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86(a)(6)(A)–(C) (West 2020). 
 136. Id. at § 1708.86(c)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). 
 137. Shao, supra note 7. 
 138. Kenneth Artz, Texas Outlaws ‘Deepfakes’—but the Legal System May Not 
Be Able to Stop Them, LAW.COM (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2019/10/11/texas-outlaws-deepfakes-but-the-
legal-system-may-not-be-able-to-stop-them/ [https://perma.cc/YL56-UVNZ]. 
 139. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019). 
 140. Artz, supra note 138. 
 141. A.B. 730, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as described in the 
Legislative Counsel’s Digest). The law is now codified under CAL. ELEC. CODE § 
20010 (West 2019). 
 142. A.B. 730; Kari Paul, California makes ‘deepfake’ videos illegal, but law may 
be hard to enforce, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/oct/07/california-makes-deepfake-videos-illegal-but-law-may-be-hard-to-
enforce [https://perma.cc/3QKL-BG47].  
 143. A.B. 730. 
 144. Id. 
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Other states have attempted to cover privacy more generally than just 
deepfakes but have not succeeded.  For example, New York discussed 
legislation that would have made it fraud to create a digital replica of someone 
without their consent.145  The intent of this bill was to protect the state’s long-
standing “right to publicity.”146  For example, creating a deepfake of an actor 
post-mortem would require the deepfaker to get the approval of the late actor’s 
estate before using his or her likeness, otherwise the deepfaker would be 
criminally liable.147  Similarly, Massachusetts introduced a bill that would 
have made the creation of a deepfake with the intent to distribute a crime of 
identity fraud.148  Missouri legislators have not passed – let alone introduced 
– any laws regulating deepfakes.  However, Missourians have not been 
completely silent about the issue; the Missouri School of Journalism, for 
example, hosted a national collegiate innovation competition which “tasked 
teams with developing tools to help verify photos, videos or audio content to 
help the industry fight against deepfakes and fabricated content.”149 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Outside of the world of pornography, the impact of deepfakes on politics 
and democracy is perhaps the largest threat.150  Given the previous summary 
of how deepfakes have been discussed by governments and the media 
nationwide, it is not surprising that deepfakes carry a negative connotation for 
a growing American population that feels democracy is threatened by fake 
news.151  When attempting to analyze deepfakes under the fabric of the First 
Amendment, there are two main categories to divide political deepfakes into: 
 
 145. N.Y. Assemb, B. A08155, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). The bill 
was not passed through the state Senate. A08155 Actions, NEW YORK STATE 
ASSEMBLY (last visited Nov. 25, 2020), 
https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A08155&term=2017&A
ctions=Y [https://perma.cc/N3SZ-4GRC]. 
 146. A08155 Chamber Transcript, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY (June 18, 2018), 
https://www2.assembly.state.ny.us/write/upload/transcripts/2017/6-18-
18.html#08155 []. 
 147. Id.  
 148. H.3366, 2019-2020 Leg., 191st Sess. (Mass. 2020).  
 149. Student team wins journalism innovation competition with deepfake fighting 
tool, UNIV. OF MO. SYS.  (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.umsystem.edu/stories/student-
team-wins-journalism-innovation-competition-deepfake-fighting-tool 
[https://perma.cc/TCG4-DTDK].  
 150. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1778; Shao, supra note 7. 
 151. See Michael Dimock, An update on our research into trust, facts and 
democracy, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/2019/06/05/an-update-on-our-research-into-trust-facts-
and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/67EJ-UP6E] (“Nearly seven-in-ten (68%) say 
made-up news and information greatly affects Americans’ confidence in government 
institutions, and roughly half (54%) say it is having a major impact on Americans’ 
confidence in each other.”). 
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(1) those that are made for comedic purposes but have negative consequences, 
and (2) those that are designed to spread misinformation and lies.152  
Depending on which category the deepfake falls under, the action against it 
might differ.  For example, deepfakes that are parodies might be handled 
through a civil case for libel,153 while a deepfake that was created to dismantle 
fair elections might be prosecuted under a statute.154  Regulating deepfakes is 
certainly not restricted to this binary, as other avenues have actively been 
explored by legislators and scholars alike.155 
A. Expanding on Deepfakes as Political Speech and Parodies 
If a deepfake teases a political candidate or government official, the 
easiest argument that the deepfaker could make in defense of their video is 
that it is a form of political speech intended to be a parody.  This argument 
has already been anticipated – and permitted – by social networking websites, 
state statutes, and federal legislation.156  But what if the deepfake is so 
convincing that it does not appear to be a parody to the “reasonable person”?  
For a parody to really achieve its goal of being humorous, it “requires the 
audience recognize both the subject of the parody and the parodist’s mocking 
distortions.”157  Perhaps there is a comparison that could be made between a 
convincing deepfake and a good impersonation.  Alec Baldwin’s 
impersonation of President Donald Trump on Saturday Night Live is a great 
example of a parody.158  If Baldwin, during his impersonation of Trump, said 
 
 152. For the purpose of the discussion in this Note, the author declines to discuss 
pornographic deepfakes and obscenity law and instead will focus on deepfakes as they 
pertain to political speech. 
 153. David Greene, We Don’t Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already Have 
Them, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/we-dont-need-new-laws-faked-videos-we-
already-have-them [https://perma.cc/E2JZ-KRBS].  
 154. See e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019). 
 155. See Edvinas Meskys et al., Regulating deep fakes: legal and ethical 
considerations, 15 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L & PRAC. 24, 30–31 (2020); Matthew F. 
Ferraro, Deepfake Legislation: A Nationwide Survey—State and Federal Lawmakers 
Consider Legislation to Regulate Manipulated Media, WILMERHALE (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190925-deepfake-
legislation-a-nationwide-survey [https://perma.cc/A28X-NYR8].  
 156. See e.g. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a)(3) (West 2019) (allowing 
a parody exception for manipulated child pornography cases); S. 3805 § 1041(d)(2) 
(granting a First Amendment exception for prosecution under the Act); Holmes, supra 
note 31 (showing that Facebook makes an exception for deepfakes categorizes as 
satire). 
 157. Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward A Coherent 
Standard of Parody As Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (1992). 
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something nonfactual and defamatory, could Trump bring a claim for libel or 
emotional distress against him?  Probably not, unless the statement made by 
Baldwin was said with “actual malice” and could not reasonably believed to 
be a joke.159 
Taking it a step further, if a deepfaker took Baldwin’s voice 
impersonation and layered it over the top of a deepfake video that looked more 
convincingly like Trump, then would Trump have a claim?  Maybe – 
depending on the context – but still probably not.  If the deepfake was very 
realistic, maybe the reasonable person might actually believe that Trump said 
the falsehoods.  Trump, however, would still need to prove that the deepfaker 
had “actual malice” behind making the video.  The “actual malice” standard 
cannot possibly cover all the bases here; after all, it is possible for a deepfake 
to mislead audiences without the deepfaker having knowledge or reckless 
disregard that the deepfake really contained untruths.160  Maybe the deepfaker 
just wanted to innocently make Baldwin’s impression resemble Trump even 
more, or maybe the deepfaker truly wanted to confuse people and hurt 
Trump’s reputation and sway an election; this would have to be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. 
For a real-life example, consider the controversy surrounding the “Yes 
Men,” a group of pranksters that use parody and satire to comment on political 
and social issues.  In 2009, The Yes Men published a fake press release that 
resembled one from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which falsely 
announced that the Chamber had changed its stance on climate regulation.161  
The Yes Men also hosted a faux press conference to accompany the press 
release.162  The Chamber of Commerce sued the Yes Men in response, 
claiming the fake press release caused public confusion after some news 
outlets treated it like it was legitimate.163  Ultimately, the Chamber dropped 
 
 159. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 56 (1988). 
 160. See James Vincent, Facebook’s problems moderating deepfakes will only get 
worse in 2020, THE VERGE (Jan. 15 2020, 12:36 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/15/21067220/deepfake-moderation-apps-tools-
2020-facebook-reddit-social-media (“Facebook said it will remove ‘manipulated 
misleading media’ . . . But the company noted that this does not cover “parody or 
satire” or misleading edits made using traditional means, like last year’s viral video of 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi supposedly slurring her words.”). 
 161. The parody press release is still accessible online. U.S. Chamber Supports 
Climate Bill, THE YES PEOPLE (Oct. 19, 2009), 
https://theyesmen.org/project/chamber/fakerelease [https://perma.cc/QP37-2JFF].  
 162. Anne C. Mulkern, U.S. Chamber Sues Activists Over Climate Stunt, N.Y. 
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the lawsuit after it extended on for four years.164  This instance illustrates that 
parodies can be highly protected by the First Amendment.  Arguing against 
parodies for libel claims can be even trickier, especially for public figures 
because of the heightened standards of “actual malice.” 
B. Deepfakes as a Vessel to Spread Political Misinformation 
Outside of deepfakes made by innocent parodies, there is a concern that 
deepfake technology could be used to purposely disseminate lies and deceit.165  
So far, there are no proven cases of deepfakes being used to interfere with 
elections, although there have been some claims that deepfakes have been 
used to tamper with international politics.166  As discussed in Part III, there 
have been some federal and state attempts to regulate deepfakes to prevent 
intrusion into elections.167  However, some of those attempts, while passed 
successfully, have come under fire for infringing on individuals’ First 
Amendment rights.168   
If a deepfake is used to falsely stir up excitement and panic about an 
upcoming election, should the First Amendment still protect that speech?  
While precedent seems to indicate that it is protected,169 it could be argued 
that, under certain circumstances, deceitful speech can have exacerbated 
harmful effects to society and should be regulated.170  However, since the 
value of deceitful speech is already low,171 if there was a need to block a 
harmful deepfake, a court could potentially classify it into one of the existing 
First Amendment exceptions – granted it actually fits into the preexisting 
 
 164. U.S. Chamber Cries Uncle, Withdraws Lawsuit, THE YES MEN (June 13, 
2013), https://theyesmen.org/chambercriesuncle. See also Yes Men Mourn Lawsuit 
Withdrawal, THE YES MEN (last visited Mar. 14, 2020), 
https://theyesmen.org/lawsuitwithdrawal [https://perma.cc/P349-MR79].  
 165. See BuzzfeedVideo, You Won’t Believe What Obama Says In This Video!, 
YOUTUBE (April 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0 
[https://perma.cc/JK49-23BG] (showing a very convincing deepfake of President 
Barack Obama, created by Buzzfeed to show how the technology can be used to depict 
incorrect information). 
 166. McFaul, supra note 3; Nic Ker, Is the political aide viral sex video confession 
real or a Deepfake?, MALAYMAIL (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/06/12/is-the-political-aide-viral-
sex-video-confession-real-or-a-deepfake/1761422 [https://perma.cc/G5VB-U4LR] 
(describing how a Malaysian cabinet minister was subjected to controversy after an 
alleged pornographic deepfake went viral). 
 167. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019); H.R. 3230. 
 168. See Artz, supra note 138; Ingram, supra note 117. 
 169. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012). 
 170. See Helen Norton, (at Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 
OKLA. L. REV. 117, 125–26 (2018). 
 171. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1791 (“Lies about the source of speech—
whether a public official is actually speaking—do not serve free speech values.”). 
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boundaries of one of those exceptions.172  Perhaps the main exception that 
would be applied to controversial deepfakes would be the restrictions laid out 
for obscenity.  Since deepfakes have a background in falsified pornographic 
videos, it may not be surprising if a deepfaker tried to sway an election by 
releasing a video of a candidate engaged in a sex act.173 
Absent some exigent circumstances, the First Amendment will probably 
protect the lies spewed from misleading deepfakes, especially if they relate to 
politics.174  However, just because the First Amendment protects certain 
speech does not mean deepfakes are excluded from private regulations or 
bans.175  One solution is to leave the regulation up to private platforms like 
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitch since these platforms already have “the most 
advanced technologies to detect immoral, illegal or malicious content, flag it 
and remove it.”176  But under this model, it is possible that deepfakes could be 
regulated more than they normally would be under the First Amendment; 
private platforms can completely ban deepfakes from their websites, but under 
the First Amendment, it is assumed that an outright ban on deepfakes would 
be unconstitutional.177  By leaving this regulation to private companies, the 
companies get complete discretion on which deepfakes have value and which 
are unacceptable, a role that typically the government plays – especially in 
regards to election tampering.  However, it is likely these online platforms do 
not really want to take on the task of policing this content.178  Although there 
is no direct incentive in place encouraging these platforms for remove 
deepfakes, there is increasing public pressure for them to regulate it, 
particularly after the wave of “fake news” concerns during the 2016 and 2020 
election seasons.179 
 
 172. Id.  (“Some deep fakes will fall into those categories and thus could be subject 
to regulation. This includes defamation of private persons, fraud, true threats, and the 
imminent-and-likely incitement of violence.”). 
 173. See Ker, supra note 166 (describing how a Malaysian cabinet minister was 
subjected to controversy after an alleged pornographic deepfake went viral). 
 174. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
 175. Meskys, supra note 154, at 31. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.; Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1788–89; see Cole, supra note 30. 
 178. Olivier Sylvain, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON 
USER DATA (2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-user-
data [https://perma.cc/7WX3-VN36]. 
 179. McCabe & Alba, supra note 28 (“False information spread furiously on the 
platform during the 2016 campaign, leading to widespread criticism of [Facebook].”); 
Sam Dean, How Facebook and Twitter plan to handle election day disinformation, 
LA TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-11-
02/election-day-2020-disinformation-facebook-instagram-twitter-youtube; Chesney 
& Citron, supra note 35, at 1795 (“Online platforms already have an incentive to 
screen content, thanks to the impact of moral suasion, market dynamics, and political 
pressures.”). 
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Additionally, while regulation gets its footing, some experts in privacy 
and technology have suggested that political campaigns create an eight-step 
plan in case a “deepfake emergency” takes place during election season: 
1. Issue a statement that the candidate will not knowingly 
disseminate fake or manipulated media of opponents and urge 
campaign supporters to abide by the same commitment . . . 2. 
Get familiar with the terms of service and community 
guidelines for social media platforms on this issue, as well as 
the processes to report inappropriate content . . . 3. Designate a 
team ready to manage an incident . . . 4. Obtain a briefing on 
key trends and threats from knowledgeable experts . . . 5. 
Conduct an internal red teaming exercise to prepare for the 
range of ways a fake could target the candidate or campaign . . . 
6. Establish relationships with company officials that will be 
helpful during an incident . . . 7. Establish procedures to quickly 
access original video and/or audio footage . . . 8. Prepare 
contingency web content or templates that could be swiftly used 
to counter false claims.180 
While these suggestions do not directly regulate deepfakes, they provide 
a framework that could help society achieve a better understanding of how 
deepfakes operate and how they can be used to skew politics and disrupt the 
political process.  According to the scholars behind these suggestions, by 
campaigns getting ahead of the threat of a “deepfake emergency,” it helps 
candidates be on the battle lines, defending truthfulness over falsehoods.181 
C. What Happens When Deepfakes Reach Courts? 
At the time of this Note, only a few courts have mentioned deepfakes, 
and their discussion has been limited to the footnotes of some cases regarding 
the technology’s impact on child pornography law.182  Most state statutes 
currently addressing deepfakes have mainly focused on preventing tampering 
in the political process, but courts will probably see cases involving deepfakes 
relating to pornography first.183  When this occurs, courts should look to 
 
 180. Katherine Charlet & Danielle Citron, Campaigns Must Prepare for 
Deepfakes: This Is What Their Plan Should Look Like, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Sept. 5, 2019), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/05/campaigns-must-prepare-for-deepfakes-
this-is-what-their-plan-should-look-like-pub-79792 [https://perma.cc/RK7A-HH3T]. 
 181. See id. (“A fake video of a candidate saying she prefers Coke to Pepsi is no 
big deal, but one where the candidate falsely appears saying or doing something 
despicable could endanger the candidacy and the democratic process.”). 
 182. See In re S.K., 215 A.3d 300, 315 n.22 (2019); United States v. Streett, No. 
CR 14-3609 JB, 2020 WL 231688, at *47 n.28 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 2020). 
 183. Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay: Deep 
Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD. 
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comparable revenge porn cases and statutes for guidance.184  Revenge porn 
cases can be compared to non-consensual pornographic deepfakes because 
both situations usually involve a person who intentionally distributes 
pornographic media without the consent of the victim, and the media would 
harm the victim’s reputation.185  Following this, it tracks that victims would 
likely bring false light privacy tort claims from these circumstances.186  
Alternatively, some prosecutors could bring charges against deepfakers if the 
content and dissemination of the deepfake fell under applicable revenge porn 
statutes.187  In California, for example, a mix of these could be possible since 
its revenge porn statute now includes an exception that is very comparable to 
the elements laid out in the leading false light privacy case, Time, Inc. v. 
Hill.188  Courts should be prepared to hear both of these types of cases, 
whether it be a civil or criminal case, and be willing to interpret the applicable 
precedent against the challenges brought by deepfake technology discussed in 
previous sections, such as parodies and other First Amendment concerns. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While deepfakes are a new phenomenon, they are quickly gaining 
popularity without an end in sight.189  While there can be some innocence in 
altering videos for laughs and entertainment,190 deepfake technology brings 
new challenges that have not been fully realized.191  Lawmakers are slowly 
 
L. REV. 882, 885–86 (2019) (showing two examples of private individuals that were 
sexually exploited by deepfake videos). 
 184. See Harris, supra note 73, at 119–20 (“Fairly recent nonconsensual 
pornography statutes may be the most effective legal recourse against uploaders of 
personal deepfakes featuring nonconsenting individuals.”). 
 185. Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest 
Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 400 (2019) (“[C]ourts may want to consider 
whether non-consensual pornography of any kind, revenge porn or deepfakes, should 
be the foundation of a new exception to the First Amendment’s broad protections.”). 
 186. Harris, supra note 73, at 115. 
 187. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a)(2) (West 2019); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2019) (showing 
some revised revenge porn state statutes that include deepfakes). 
 188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86(c)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2019) (showing that “[a] work 
of political or newsworthy value or similar work” can be protected); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
385 U.S. 374, 377 (1967) (holding that when speech relates to matters of public 
interest, it is subjected to higher standards before the creator is subject to liability). 
 189. Meskys, supra note 155, at 24. 
 190. See Collider Videos, Tom Cruise IMPOSSIBLE BURGER Challenge! 
(Deepfake Parody), YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ntnveCh691M [https://perma.cc/579X-U8YJ] 
(showing a deepfaked video of Tom Cruise going grocery shopping for the 
“Impossible Burger”). 
 191. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 183, at 885 (“It is unclear who will win 
this arms race, but for now the fight is on.”). 
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but surely learning more about the technology and its impact on politics and 
individual privacy.192  In an age of “fake news,” the need to understand 
deepfakes is pressing if we want to ensure trust in democracy and preserve the 
need for truth over lies.193  Suppression of deepfake technology may mean 
suppression of rights.194  But an absence of regulation leaves the nation 
vulnerable to election tampering and political dismantlement.195  In this sense, 
the still waters of deepfake technology really do run… well, deep. 
 
 
 192. See, e.g., S.1790 § 5709. 
 193. Schwartz, supra note 23 (quoting scholar Danielle Citron saying, “I’m 
starting to see how a well-timed deep fake could very well disrupt the democratic 
process.”). 
 194. Meskys, supra note 155, at 29 (“Creative deep fakes could be considered a 
constitutive part of free speech.”). 
 195. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1778. 
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